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Abstract: Commercial gambling is increasingly viewed as being part of the unhealthy commodities
industries, in which products contribute to preventable ill-health globally. Britain has one of the
world’s most liberal gambling markets, meaning that the regulatory changes there have implications
for developments elsewhere. A review of the British Gambling Act 2005 is underway. This has
generated a range of actions by the industry, including mobilising arguments around the threat of
the “black market”. We critically explore industry’s framing of these issues as part of their strategy to
resist regulatory change during the Gambling Act review. We used a predefined review protocol to
explore industry narratives about the “black market” in media reports published between 8 December
2020 and 26 May 2021. Fifty-five articles were identified and reviewed, and themes were narratively
synthesised to examine industry framing of the “black market”. The black market was framed
in terms of economic threat and loss, and a direct connection was made between its growth and
increased regulation. The articles mainly presented gambling industry perspectives uncritically,
citing industry-generated evidence (n = 40). Industry narratives around the “black market” speak to
economically and emotionally salient concerns: fear, safety, consumer freedom and economic growth.
This dominant framing in political, mainstream and industry media may influence political and
public opinion to support the current status quo: “protecting” the existing regulated market rather
than “protecting” people. Debates should be reframed to consider all policy options, especially those
designed to protect public health.
Keywords: gambling; Great Britain; Gambling Act review; black market; unhealthy commodities; regulation
1. Introduction
1.1. Gambling, Regulation and the “Black Market”
Gambling is increasingly recognised as part of the unhealthy commodities industries,
contributing to preventable ill-health and mortality [1]. Opportunities for commercial
forms of gambling, along with technological advances that change the provision and
type of gambling products offered, are growing worldwide. The gambling industry,
especially the online industry, is global, with operators providing services and targeting
markets across many jurisdictions [2]. The online industry is powering growth in the sector.
In Britain alone, the remote gambling sector is now a GBP 5.7 billion industry [3]. Great
Britain has one of the most liberal gambling markets in the world, and the ways that it is
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regulated there has implications for regulatory development elsewhere. Concerns about
these developments, particularly its impacts on public health, have been raised [4,5]. This
includes recent reports conservatively estimating that the social and economic costs of
gambling in England alone amount to at least GBP 1.27 billion [6]. In response to these
concerns, in 2020, the UK Government announced a comprehensive review of gambling
legislation (the 2005 Gambling Act review), with specific focus on updating legislation
for the digital era [7]. This included a focus on potential changes to online gambling
provision, including consideration of introducing affordability measures, or deposit and
staking limits, as already available in other jurisdictions, such as Sweden or Spain [8].
This review creates uncertainty about how gambling regulation, specifically online
gambling regulation, may change. Since 2005, Britain’s gambling laws have been amongst
the most liberal in the world, allowing all forms of gambling to be legally provided in
land-based venues as well as online. Since the announcement of this legislative review,
the gambling industry, along with those advocating for policy change, have engaged in
high-profile campaigns to ensure that their views, perspectives and opinions are heard.
Key issues included within the review are the impact of stricter regulation upon the
“black market” for gambling. In many jurisdictions, containment of the “black market”
especially for online gambling, has a been a driver for the legalisation of online gambling
products [9,10]. In Britain, which already has a legal and relatively liberal gambling market,
the question is inverted and rather is concerned with the potential impact of greater
regulatory restrictions upon demand for alternative “black market” provision.
In terms of international gambling policy, few jurisdictions have imposed greater
regulatory restrictions on pre-existing legal and regulated markets. Where this has oc-
curred, there has been little systematic evaluation of the impact. For example, in recent
years, one of the most significant changes to British gambling regulation was the 2019
reduction in the maximum stake size from GBP 100 to GBP 2 on so-called Fixed Odd Betting
Terminals. As this change was not fully evaluated, we have little insight into the kinds
of individual behaviour changes that followed [11]. Elsewhere, Wardle et al. [12] noted
that, when gambling opportunities were restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic, regular
gamblers did not appear to switch behaviours or products, and queried the assumptions of
linear “black market” transitions. This reflects the experience in Norway, when electronic
gambling machines were removed from the market, with Lund [13] concluding that there
was no indication of the development of a black market for machines or substitution to
other forms of gambling [13]. In general, the evidence base around the impact of regulatory
changes on “black market” activity is nascent. This creates a situation in which competing
narratives have space and opportunity to fill the void.
As a live policy debate that will continue for the next two to three years, it is essential
to understand how issues such as the impact of regulatory change upon the “black market”
are framed by key actors, particularly, in the case explored here, the gambling industry.
Framing establishes the parameters within which social problems can be discussed and
how they are conceived, and it also determines the range of solutions. Social and political
scientists contend that debates over framing are power struggles over who defines what
counts as a social problem and—importantly—what solutions can solve it. As such, fram-
ing is about agenda setting, policy formation and resource allocation [14–17]. Reflecting
this, researchers [1,18] advocated for taking a systematic approach to understanding the
actions of the unhealthy commodities industries, including gambling, in an attempt to
restrain public health action. Knai et al. [1] argued for the need to “focus on the narratives
constructed by political actors attempting to frame political problems, attribute respon-
sibility for them and advocate particular solutions”. However, a systematic, empirical,
evidence base that examines these issues within a British context is only just starting to
emerge [19].
The announcement of the Gambling Act review and the specific questions it posed
around the “black market” created a space for the gambling industry to put forward its
opinions about the impact of regulation. The narrative advanced here, in common with
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those of other unhealthy commodity industries, such as tobacco and alcohol, is based on the
argument that increasing regulation increases the “black market” for a commodity [16,20].
However, unlike physical products such as tobacco or alcohol, gambling is increasingly a
digital commodity. In this context, concerns about containment and control involved in
“black market” narratives are particularly salient.
Focus on so-called ”black markets” is part of a wider industry “playbook” whereby
companies deploy strategies to resist regulation and to undermine public health initia-
tives. These include political lobbying; research sponsorship; and promoting discourses
that legitimise their business model, including casting doubt on scientific evidence and
mobilising arguments about complexity [21–24]. They also include mobilising narratives
around the potential threat of unlicensed markets: a tactic the tobacco industry has fre-
quently employed [25,26]. Gallagher et al. [20] noted that transnational tobacco companies
(TTCs) frequently fund (unreliable) research into illicit trade and use the reports to back
claims about the threat of the black market and to resist policies of tobacco control. As van
Schalkwyk et al. [19] highlighted, focus on illicit trade is a familiar trope. When applied
to gambling, the potential reach and reception of these framings are heightened not only
because of the increasingly digital and transnational nature of the product but also because
of a lack of credible and independent evidence about the scale of the “black market” it-
self [27]. This generates the conditions whereby industry framing of these issues speak to a
number of economically and emotionally salient concerns, namely fear, safety, consumer
freedom and economic growth.
Examining the ways in which the gambling industry frame debates about the “black
market” provides a case study of how they attempt to influence policy action and to enact
forms of regulatory resistance. In this paper, we explore this by conducting a narrative
content analysis of media articles to examine how arguments around the so-called “black
market” are mobilised and who is mobilising them. In doing so, we critically examine
what messages are communicated via different mediums and what framing devices are
used to shape the debate and assess how these may have changed. First, we present
some background on the regulatory and policy context of gambling in Britain. We outline
the background of the Gambling Act review before outlining the actions taken by key
representatives of the gambling industry in response to it.
1.2. The Gambling Act Review and the “Black Market”
A review of the Gambling Act 2005 was a 2019 General Election manifesto promise
for most major political parties in Great Britain, including the now incumbent ruling party,
the Conservatives. In February 2020, the National Audit Office [28] released its assessment
of the performance of the Gambling Commission, the industry regulator, highlighting
structural issues with how gambling is regulated. In July 2020, the House of Lords Select
Committee Enquiry [29] released the findings of its inquiry on the social and economic
impacts of the gambling industry, arguing that it was time for change. In addition, an All
Party Parliamentary Group tasked with examining gambling harms has been increasingly
vocal about the need for changes in the way gambling is regulated, promoted and provided
in Britain. The official review was launched on 8 December 2020 [7]. It opened with a call
for evidence on over 40 questions of interest. Three questions were specifically related to
potential “black market” activity:
• What, if any, evidence is there to suggest that there is currently a significant black
market for gambling in Great Britain or that there is a risk of one emerging?
• What evidence, if any, is there on the ease with which consumers can access black
market gambling websites in Great Britain?
• How easy is it for consumers to tell that they are using an unlicensed illegal operator?
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The call for evidence closed on 31 March 2021. Responses to these questions will
form the basis of a further public consultation on a draft white paper outlining suggested
changes, likely to be launched in late 2021/early 2022. Thus, at the time of writing, Great
Britain is in the early stages of the Gambling Act review process. Its formal announcement
generated a significant amount of research and promotional activity by all stakeholders.
Although used in the review, the term ”black market” covers a range of gambling
products and services that are not legally offered in Britain. Britain provides a licensed
gambling market requiring operators to seek permission to operate from the Gambling
Commission (GC). Technically, anyone providing gambling services to Great Britain with-
out a valid license is illegally providing gambling services in Britain. Unlicensed actors
may range from corporations licensed in other jurisdictions to criminal syndicates [30].
Some unlicensed operators may be licensed and regulated elsewhere, whereas others are
not. In addition, the illegal market for gambling includes gambling and betting with digital
items, such as skins. In short, there is considerable linguistic ambiguity about the spectrum
of actors that constitute the “black market” in gambling.
1.3. Initial Gambling Industry Responses to the Gambling Act Review
The main leaders in lobbying for the British gambling industry are the newly formed
Betting and Gaming Council (BGC), who are now the single trade body for the British
gambling industry. The BGC focuses on promoting so-called “responsible gambling”, and
their aims and objectives are, in their terms, to “safeguard” and “empower” the customer
as the key to a thriving UK gaming and betting industry and to ensure that changes in
regulation are, in their terms, “considered, proportionate and balanced”. On 20 December
2020, 12 days after the formal announcement of the Gambling Act review, the BGC began
a campaign to promote its position and perspective on the “black market”. To begin,
they issued a press release entitled “Black Market Threat”, quoting unpublished research
conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC, London, UK) in 2018/19. This was followed
by a new report, also authored by PWC, published on 4 February 2021 [31], accompanied
by a media strategy to disseminate the findings. This included personal appearances
from BGC spokespeople on radio and television media, interviews with newspapers, and
opinion pieces in newspapers such as The Times [32]. These actions sparked a wave of
further commentary, including from the industry regulator (the GC) and others within
the gambling industry as well as from academic circles. A chronology of these events is
illustrated in Figure 1, along with other key publications during this period.
To explore these actions further, we conducted a narrative media analysis to review
and critically examine the early arguments made around questions of the “black market”.
Our analysis was guided by the following research questions:
1. What is the nature of reporting and discussion around unlicensed gambling in the
UK in the initial stages of the Gambling Act review (December 2020–May 2021)?
2. What type of publications/authors invoke the use of the “black market”, and how is
this framed?
3. What is omitted/not discussed from this public discussion?
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Figure 1. Ti i e of key events.
2. Materials and Methods
To analyse messaging and reporting around themes of the “black market”, we con-
ducted a narrative media content review using Google News and LexisNexis (New York,
NY, USA) to search for all media reports discussing the “black”, “unregulated”, “unli-
censed” or “illeg l” market in B itain between 8 December a d 27 May 2021. A review
protocol was produced and agreed upon by all team members (see the Supplementary
Material, Table S1). Searches were conducted by H.W. and F.D. in the week commencing on
24 May 2021 (see Figure 2). After screening for eligibility, all relevant articles were extracted
and summarised by type of article, type of publication, whether the “black market” was
the key focus, who broadly discussed the “black market”, whether the “black market”
was mentioned in response to other research data or regulatory change, and whether
any critiques of the “black market” analysis or arguments were included. Articles were
excluded if they were not UK-focused, did not mention the “black market” for gambling
or were outside the data range. Data extraction was undertaken by H.W. and checked by
F.D. The articles were read and reread by H.W. to initially identify the broad narrative
themes within each article [33]. These were discussed with the broader team, and the
thematic groupings we e agreed upon. The data extraction framework was amended so
that information on ach theme within the anal sis could be record d (where possible) for
each article. This included recording who discussed the “black market”, what the broader
context of the article was and whether any countervailing viewpoints were presented. The
first ten articles were extracted using this framework, and the themes were discussed and
finalised with the authors. Once all extraction was completed, a final narrative synthesis
of themes was undertaken. The articles were also coded to examine their tone, in terms
of whether they were pro-indu try, balanced or industry ritic l. C ding was guided by
noting whether only ne perspective was prese ted, whether only i dustry sources were
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quoted, and whether any critical discussion of industry perspectives or countervailing
viewpoints were discussed. This coding was undertaken independently by two raters,
and the results were compared (inter-relater reliability was k = 0.71, defined as substantial
agreement according to Landis and Koch [34]). Disagreements were discussed between the
two coders, and a final assessment was agreed upon. Finally, to further assess heterogeneity
within the review, the articles were also coded for their source (industry press, national
press, regional press and political press). All data were recorded in an excel database, al-
lowing analysts to filter by article type to assess whether the results varied across different
types of media publications (database available upon request).
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3. Results
3.1. Search Results and Characteristics of Studies
Once duplicates were removed, 55 media articles were included within the review
(Figure 2 an Table 1 for the articles included in the review). This i ed 33 art cles
from industry press, 12 from national press, 6 from regional press and 4 from political
press. The majority were news reports, reporting the latest developments impacting the
gambling industry and/or policies (n = 31). The remainder were opinion pieces or review
articles, giving an overview of key issues around the Gambling Act review. By-lines were
attributed to 28 different journalists, with the BGC having four articles where the by-line
was attributed to them. Most articles presented one perspective only on the risk of the
black market (n = 40), namely that of the industry, and the tone of most articles refl cted
industry viewpoints uncritically, wi h ittle countervaili g vi ws or opinions presented
(n = 36). Only three articles were designated as industry critical (all published in national
mainstream media), whilst the remaining articles presented more balanced perspectives
from a range of stakeholders (n = 16). Whilst this may seem unsurprising, given the bias
towards industry-focused publications included within the review, not all pro-industry
articles came from this source. Of those from national, regional or political press (n = 22);
13 were categorised as being pro-industry in tone.
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Table 1. Summary of articles included in the review.
Title Publication Publication Type Date By-Line Article Type Tone
William Hill CEO: important that gambling review
strikes right balance [35] Gambling Insider Industry press 8 December 2021 Tim Poole Opinion piece Pro-industry
Betting and Gaming Council chair cautions against
severe gambling review [36] Racing Post Industry press 8 December 2021 Jonathan Harding News piece Pro-industry
UK government launches consultation on
updating gambling laws for digital age [37] Mondaq Legal press 10 December 2021 Geraint Lloyd-Taylor Opinion piece Balanced
Betting and Gaming Council issues renewed black
market warning [38] Casino Beats Industry press 21 December 2020 NA News report Pro-industry
UK sees 27 m visits to black market sites in a
year [39] iGaming Business Industry press 21 December 2020 Richard Mulligan News report Pro-industry
UK online black market sees 27 m visits in a year:
BGC warns over gambling review [40] Yogonet Industry press 22 December 2020 NA News report Pro-industry
Government must tackle rates gambling addiction
which crisis waiting happen according to MP [41] Dewsbury Reporter Regional press 7 January 2021 Ian Hirst News report Balanced
UK gambling operators criticized for overstating
black market threat [42] Gambling News Industry press 18 January 2021 Fiona Simmons News report Balanced
UK gambling firms accused of exaggerating scale
of black market betting [43] The Guardian National press 18 January 2021 Rob Davies News report Industry-critical
Teens blowing 1.4 billion black market
gambling [44] The Sun National press 20 January 2021 David Wooding News report Pro-industry
Winning Post playing it straight on black market
threats [45] SBC News Industry press 25 January 2021 Regulus Partners Opinion piece Pro-industry
Sunak monitors gambling review closely [46] SBC News Industry press 29 January 2021 Ted Menmuir News report Pro-industry
Rishi Sunak raises concerns of enhanced
affordability checks [47] Inkedin Industry press 29 January 2021 NA News report
Higher license fees to help gambling commission
address modern challenges [48] Gambling News Industry press 31 January 2021 Fiona Simmons News report Balanced
Cruddace shares concerns on gambling review [49] Racing TV Industry press 31 January 2021 NA News report Balanced
Cruddace airs concerns on gambling review [50] Evening Times(Glasgow) Regional press 01 February 2021 Matthew Johnstone News report Balanced
Entain launches consumer representation initiative
the players panel [51] SBC News Industry press 01 February 2021 Ted Orme-clay News report Pro-industry
UK betting faces bigger threats than losing its sport
shirts [52] The Guardian National press 01 February 2021 Rob Davies Opinion piece Balanced
BGC determined to drive change as UKGC clamps
down on slots [53] Casino beats Industry press 02 February 2021 NA News report Pro-industry
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Table 1. Cont.
Title Publication Publication Type Date By-Line Article Type Tone
Industry urges GC to heed black market warnings in
gambling act review [54] iGaming Business Industry press 04 February 2021 Robert Fletcher News report Pro-industry
Number of British punters using black market gambling
sites more than doubles [55] Politics Home Political press 04. February 2020 BGC Opinion piece Pro-industry
Black market doubles during pandemic [56] The Telegraph National press 04 February 2021 Oliver Gill News report Pro-industry
Even low levels of gambling linked to financial hardship
study finds [57] The Guardian National press 04 February 2021 Rob Davies News report Balanced
Ministers should beware driving gamblers to the black
market [32] The Times National press 04 February 2021 Michael Dugher, BGC Opinion piece Pro-industry
Gambling limits an invasion of privacy [58] Sunday Express National press 07 February 2021 David Maddox News report Pro-industry
PWC report shows British black market gambling
doubled since 2018 [59] City A.M. National press 05 February 2021 Clara Dijstrak News report Pro-industry
Its long overdue: Northern Ireland gambling laws set for
significant reform [60] Racing Post Industry press 08 February 2021 Bill Barber News report Pro-industry
William Hill’s Ulrik Bengtsson: claiming the black
market doesn’t exist is like saying the earth is flat [61] SBC News Industry press 08 February 2021 NA Opinion piece Pro-industry
Bad bet: how the gambling industry is lobbying hard
against online betting reform [62] Left Foot Forward Political press 09 February 2021 Howard Reed Opinion piece Industry-critical
BLACK MARKET DANGER MP warns of ‘disastrous’
consequences affordability checks on punters will have
on racing [63]
The Sun National press 09 February 2021 Bruce Archer News report Pro-industry
Donoughue cuts ties with all party betting gaming
group [64] SBC News Industry press 12 February 2021 Ted Menmuir News report Pro-industry
Flutter’s Ian Proctor outlines affordability approach [65] SBC News Industry press 12 February 2021 Ted Orme-clay News report Pro-industry
British Racing bodies hit out at disastrous affordability
checks plans [66] iGaming Business Industry press 15 February 2021 Robert Fletcher News report Pro-industry
Government’s review into gambling laws must take
heed of black market threat warn industry experts [67] London Post Regional press 15 February 2021 NA News report Pro-industry
All bets are off for gambling reforms in the UK [68] London on the inside Regional press 25 February 2021 NA Review Balanced
Stadium walks held to call for end to football betting
ads [69] BBC News National press 06 March 2021 NA News report Industry critical
ILLEGAL BET SITE FEARS Black market betting ‘will
rocket if new laws are too strict’ [70] The Sun National press 07 March 2021 David Wooding News report Pro-industry
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Table 1. Cont.
Title Publication Publication Type Date By-Line Article Type Tone
BGC poll reveals public opposition to bet
limits [71] SBC News Industry press 8 March 2021 Ted Orme-clay News report Pro-industry
Poll: Gambling Limits Prove Unpopular in
Britain [72] The Blood-Horse Industry press 08 March 2021 Scott Burton News report Pro-industry
Brits oppose gambling limits poll
concludes [73] Casino.org Industry press 09 March 2021 Devin O’Connor News report Pro-industry
SMF: UK economy could benefit from strict
gambling laws [74] Gambling Insider Industry press 10 March 2021 NA News report Balanced
Study claims 5% of accounts responsible for
70% of British GGY [75] iGaming Business Industry press 12 March 2021 Daniel O’Boyle News report Pro-industry
Consultant: More research into black
market motivations needed instead of
“misplaced critique” [27]
Gambling Insider Industry press 12 March 2021 Iqbal Jonal Opinion piece Balanced
BGC reasserts zero tolerance approach to
betting by under-18 s [76] Casino Beats Industry press 15 March 2021 NA News report Pro-industry
Natcen report fails to highlight recent work
to raise standards says BGC [77] Casino Beats Industry press 15 March2021 NA News report Pro-industry
How to control gambling in a digital
age [78] The Yorkshire Post Regional press 18 March 2021 Christopher Snowdon Opinion piece Pro-industry
How can we make gambling regulation fit
for the digital age? [79] Politics Home Political press 31 March 2021
Jette Nygaard-Andersen, Chief
Executive, Entain Opinion piece Pro-industry
Battles ahead for British bookies [80] iGaming Business Industry press 31 March 2021 Daniel O’Boyle Review Balanced
Striking the legal balance [81] Gambling Insider Industry press 19 April 2021 NA Opinon piece Balancd
Betting and gaming industry unites once
again for safer gambling week 2021 [82] Politics Home Political press 20 April 2021 BGC Opinion piece Pro-industry
Betting and Gaming Council
Statement—Response To The ‘Peers For
Gambling Reform’ Report [83]
Politics Home Political press 26 April 2021 BGC Opinion piece Pro-industry
Modernisation of Gambling Taxes and How
It Will Affect the Industry [84]
Warrington
WorldWide Regional News 26 April 2021 Hannah Skentelbery Review Balanced
Gamcare urges a unified response to
address gambling block loopholes [85] Casino Beats Industry press 26 April 2021 NA News report Balanced
Gamcare workshop highlights how
gambling blocks can be bypassed [86] SBC News Industry news 27 April 2021 Ted Menmuir News report Pro-industry
Betting and Gaming Council’s response to
peers for gambling reforms report [87] European Gaming Industry press 27 April 2021 Niji Narayan News report Pro-industry
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 11566 10 of 20
3.2. Narrative Themes Identified within Articles
Our analysis identified six interlinked themes that typify how media have discussed
the “black market” for gambling since the launch of the Gambling Act review. These
themes focused on “black market” growth, determinism and displacement, economic and
political contribution and loss, safety and protection, and retort and response. Each of these
are discussed in detail below.
3.2.1. “Black Market” Growth
Many articles cited the reports issued by the BGC (n = 27 out of 55), conducted by the
consultancy firm PWC, which claims that the “black market” is currently a growing threat.
Citing statistics generated by an online survey, headlines focused on the black market
“doubling” in size between 2018/19 and 2020. This was based on the report finding that
the proportion of online gamblers who said that they had used an unlicensed operator
grew from 2.2% in 2018/19 to 4.5% in November 2020 [31]. This statistic was reported in
the industry, national and regional press. This narrative was repeated by industry spokes-
people in subsequent reports, describing the “growing online black market” [74,75,83,87]
or criticising those who questioned these data by saying:
“There are people in the anti-gambling lobbying regimes that seem to deny that
the black market exists . . . To me that is sort of saying that the Earth is flat. It’s
very clear that there is a black market for gambling and I think anyone should be
worried by the fact that the numbers have doubled in about a year” [61].
A few media articles carried critiques of the data from the PWC reports. They tended
to focus on the Gambling Commission’s prior rebuttal that data from these reports were
“not consistent with the intelligence picture” [35,43] and highlighted flaws in the study
methodology. A further critique of the survey results was published by Howard Reed in
the magazine Left Foot Forward [62]. Reed suggested that the apparent increase between
years could be an artefact of the COVID-19 pandemic, with people substituting terrestrial
for online gambling, and noted that the same report shows a marked decline in “black
market” visits when measured using Google Analytics [62]. This contextual finding was
omitted from many media reports. For Reed, the critical point was that the current “black
market” share is relatively small, and he advocated focusing on the performance of the
regulated market. Others agreed, stating that more was needed to understand why and
how people were gambling outside of the regulated markets:
“[T]he biggest single challenge in making any real impact assessment of any
black market is that no-one knows the real scale or scope of such a market, by
definition. It is not measured, not is it easily measurable.” [27].
However, these critiques and rebuttals were only evident in a minority of articles (n = 15).
Most simply carried the narrative of growth with no contextualisation or critical analysis.
3.2.2. Determinism and Displacement
The relationship between regulatory change and risk of an emerging “black market”
was presented in a deterministic fashion in many media reports. This tended to follow the
argument that, if you restrict gambling in Britain, people will seek these products elsewhere.
Media reports that included this theme tended to directly quote industry spokespeople on
this point:
“If people were restricted, they would simply migrate to the growing unlicensed,
unsafe, black market” [83].
“If checks are unnecessarily onerous, punters will go to the unsafe black market” [36].
“Black market betting will rocket if new laws are too strict” [70].
These remarks from industry commentators suggest a wholesale shift from regulated
to unlicensed markets in the face of further regulatory restrictions. The potential restrictions
that the industry responded to are varied, ranging from affordability checks—which
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involves checks on the ability of gamblers to pay—to online product control—such as
reduced stake sizes. These public health measures were described as “draconian” [79],
“onerous” [47], interventions from the “nanny state” and “the forces of prohibition” [64],
which would result in “over-regulation” [54]. The implication was that further regulatory
intervention would accelerate the threat of the “black market”. A few of the news reports
(n = 10 out of 39) that included such industry statements critiqued or contextualised these
statements. Contextualisation tended to be provided within opinion pieces, with one
author noting the following:
“The risks of driving people to the black market may be offset by more expansive
powers and funding for the Gambling Commission” [81].
Others cited the riposte issued by the Gambling Commission that the industry was
exaggerating the threat of the black market [42,43,48,54,56,57,66,71].
3.2.3. Economic and Political Contribution and Loss
When discussing the “black market”, some articles invoked a parallel narrative based
on the idea that gambling contributes to the British economy; thus, any movement of
gambling to the illegal market represents a loss for the UK economy overall. These
statements, put forward by industry spokespeople, tended to be coupled with “warnings”
to policy makers and government to think carefully before taking action that would risk
economic contribution through taxes and employment:
“The regulated betting and gaming industry employs 100,000 men and women
and pays £3.2 bn a year in tax to the Treasury, so the Government needs to be
wary of doing anything that puts that at risk.” [40].
The “black market”, by contrast, was typified as follows:
“[U]nlicensed, unsafe [black market online] that employs no one, pays no tax
and contributes nothing to UK PLC” [74,83,87].
Loss was not only typified as economic loss but also as potential loss of political
support. In one article, the BGC noted the following:
“I hope politicians will also take heed of the findings and listen to voters in
Northern and Midlands marginal seats—who will be key to the result of the
next election—who are wary of being told by Westminster how to live their lives,
especially in the wake of the COVID pandemic” [71].
3.2.4. Safety and Protection
The term “unsafe” was commonly used when describing the “black market”, specif-
ically referring to the lack of consumer protection offered by “black market” operators.
Citing statements from industry representatives, some articles stated that “black market”
operators had “no consumer protections” [35,36]. Others went further and described the
black market as “dangerous” [54,64,67]. Parallels were drawn with organised crime, and
one article included a quote describing “black market” online operators as follows:
“[The] modern day internet equivalent of the ‘Peaky Blinders’—dangerous, illegal
backstreet bookies, run by organised crime” [70].
A BGC representative emphasised the “unsafe” nature of the “black market” to certain
individuals by stating the following:
“I have never met a problem gambler who has not gambled on the black market” [50].
As well as linking illegal gambling to organised crime, it was common to emphasise
that unlicensed operators have none of the consumer protection safeguards that currently
exist within the British, licensed marketplace and that this was a threat to consumer safety.
Here, narratives of consumer safety intersected with lost revenues, with the argument put
forward that once people are lost to the “black market”, the regulated market can no longer
protect them [38,52,54,67].
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3.2.5. Balance and Proportion
A common theme in the discussion around the “black market” was an appeal to
balance—that changes in regulation should be balanced against the threat of the growing
“black market”. Some also discussed achieving the correct balance between protecting
what they termed as the few or “tiny minority” [79] harmed against infringing the liberty
of the many [36]. This tended to be discussed in terms of narratives of proportionality,
reasonableness and care, emphasising cautious approaches to regulatory change from the
perspective of the industry:
“It is important to stress that the big increase in the black market is not an
argument against more changes to the regulated industry, but an argument that
we need to get them right” [54].
“It is important the review is evidence-led, strikes the right balance between
protecting the vulnerable and the continued enjoyment of the many tens of
millions who happily place the occasional bet, as well as taking a critical look at
the growing risks of the black market” [35].
“You’ve got to be careful and reasonable in what you do. A £2 limit on table games
[such as online roulette] would give you a problem with the black market.” [52].
3.2.6. Retort and Response
Finally, in some articles, the “black market” threat was used as a retort to publications
that presented information supporting regulatory change. For example, the BGC responded
to two independent reports on the economic impact of gambling that suggested that
regulatory restrictions would have a net benefit on the economy overall by re-emphasising
the narrative that restrictions would move people to the “black market” [84]. In response
to a report published by NatCen Social Research (London, UK), which found that 70%
of revenue from online casinos was generated from 5% of players, industry responses
emphasised the steps they had taken to raise standards and how none of these standards
applied to the unsafe “black market” [75,77]. Industry announcements of support for
“safer” gambling weeks were accompanied by statements that none of the measures in
the regulated market apply to the unregulated market [82]. The narrative of the “black
market” was mobilised in industry responses to other initiatives: when showing support
for the Gambling Commission’s introduction of safer game standards, the BGC noted
that this did not exist for “black market” operators [53]. In an article covering the “Big
Step” movement—a charity that raises awareness of gambling harms and seeks to end
the relationship between football and gambling—an industry representative stated that
sponsorship and advertising were a vital way for consumers to distinguish between the
legal and illegal market [69].
4. Discussion
Since the announcement of the Gambling Act review in December 2020, debates about
the “black market” have been increasingly weaponised by certain sections of the gambling
industry. This trend was exacerbated by the inclusion of specific questions on the issue
of the black market within the Gambling Act review’s call for evidence. The gambling
industry, similar to other UCIs, utilises a number of strategies to avoid regulatory action,
to undermine public health reform and to promote their agenda. Framing is a crucial part
of this agenda [1]. It establishes the parameters for debate, defining how we think about an
issue and—crucially—about what we can do about it.
Our analysis shows some of the ways in which industry actors have sought to promote
a particular framing of the issue of the “black market” in an attempt to influence public
and political debate around tighter regulation using a framing that exploits a number
of politically, economically and emotionally salient concerns. These relate to fear, safety,
consumer freedom and economic growth.
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These industry narratives are embedded within a deterministic causal framework
based on the proposition that, if the government enacts greater regulatory restrictions,
there will be a wholesale shift of consumers to the “unsafe” black market. This framing
has economic and emotional connotations, positioning a potential regulatory shift as
representing a loss of contribution to the economy and loss of opportunity to protect
consumers from harms. The question about the impact of regulatory change and its
relationship to the “black market” is an important one. However, it requires a more
nuanced assessment of the shape and nature of the relationship than appears evident in
the articles reviewed. This relates both to the type of restrictions proposed, the number
of people these restrictions are likely to effect and the range of mitigating actions that
could be implemented to restrain the “black market”. For example, most of the restrictions
suggested pertain only to online gambling, an activity in which only around ten percent
of the population engage, with even fewer engaging very frequently [88]. Some have
suggested that the value of deposit limits be set at around GBP 100 per month, the median
amount spent by online gamblers [89]. Thus, the number of people likely affected by
these changes are a minority of a minority. Whilst this minority is clearly lucrative for
the industry, the industry itself would also be heavily invested in limiting “black market”
movement, and it is likely that they would establish and support systems to help detect
and prevent this. Very few of the articles reviewed included this kind of nuance, instead
presenting arguments as a dichotomy between prohibition and legalisation and the size of
the “black market” being inversely related to each. This is a relationship that recent reports
around the legalisation of marijuana in North America, for example, have casts doubt upon
in terms of noting potential black market expansion in the face of legalisation [90].
Notably, the assumption of a linear relationship between greater restrictions and
migration to “black market” trade is not backed by evidence. The BGC’s own research
showed a significant reduction in unique unlicensed operator sites between 2018/19 and
2020 [31], despite that being a period of increased regulatory strictures (for example,
removing the use of credit cards for gambling). The regulator themselves stated that
notions of black market growth were inconsistent with their own intelligence picture [43].
Experience from other UCI’s, especially tobacco, suggests that industry claims of increases
in illicit trade as a result of greater regulation should be treated with caution [20], specifically
when results from industry-funded research is compared with independent data [91].
Indeed, based on critical analyses of industry actions within tobacco, researchers have
concluded that industry estimates of the impact of regulatory change on “black market
provision” are over-stated [20,69]. However, similar evidence and investigation tends to
be lacking for the field of gambling. As Richardson states (quoted in [27]) independent
and credible research into the scale and scope of the black market in gambling is nascent.
This creates a lacuna in the evidence base into which industry-funded research can move.
This is clearly the case in Britain, where the BGC produces press releases of reports that are
not available to the public and publicises subsequent research that has not been subjected
to peer review. At the same time, the regulator’s own intelligence, suggesting that these
reports over-estimate concerns, are downplayed by the industry. Evidence from other
UCI’s, such as tobacco, show similarities between the actions of the tobacco industry
around their assessment of the risks of regulatory change upon the “black market” and
tactics currently employed by some elements of the British Gambling Industry [20,91].
Industry framing of the “black market” threat is situated within broader debates
about the role of gambling in British life and culture. These include claims about the
supposed economic contribution of the gambling industry in terms of the creation of
jobs and tax contribution. They are entwined with appeals to the idea of national wealth
and counterposed with the idea of its loss to foreign competition: a trope that has a long
historical lineage in attempts to justify protectionist economic policies [92]. Here, industry
actors argue that the current “positive” contribution to the “UK PLC”, that is, the UK
economy, must be maintained and that tax revenue is not lost to foreign entities. These
assertions have been critically examined by two independent reports, both of which state
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that the contribution gambling makes to the economy is over-stated and that economic
benefits may be accrued by restricting gambling. This occurs because consumer expenditure
would be diverted elsewhere, towards commodities with greater economic multiplier
effects, so generating greater, not less, economic contributions. Neither of these reports
consider the societal costs engendered by gambling harms, which recently have been
estimated to be in excess of GBP 1.27 billion [6]. However, responses to these economic
research reports, which were published during the review period, were dismissed by the
industry as a “fantasy”, and the threat of the “black market” was reiterated [83].
Themes that run throughout our analysis include notions of “responsible gambling”
and “freedom of choice” [93,94]. These, in turn, are embedded in broader neoliberal
ideologies about “free” consumer choice and loosely regulated markets. Industry-based
narratives that claim the “enjoyment” of millions of gamblers are threatened by onerous
regulatory change seeking to downplay the number of people harmed by gambling and
focusing on ideas about recreation, leisure and choice of the “responsible majority” in-
stead [94]. This kind of framing is located within wider neoliberal tropes of consumer
sovereignty and a rejection of what is framed as “paternalistic” state interference [92,95]. It
is also employed by other UCIs, who claim that the freedom to choose is sacrosanct and
that choice should not be constrained by the state—typically referred to in these kinds of
narratives as the ”nanny state”—even in the pursuit of health protection [21,96].
Our analysis revealed little resistance to these industry-led narratives. Few of the
articles reviewed attempted to critically examine the circumstances and actions that may
restrain or protect against “black market” activity. Only 15 out of the 55 articles reviewed
included any kind of countervailing perspectives to industry narratives. A more nuanced
assessment of the risks and solutions necessary to restrain further growth of illegal gam-
bling activity are, by and large, absent from the framing of these issues. Other jurisdictions
have instituted disruption measures to reduce unlicensed gambling, including pop-up
messaging warning of accessing unlawful websites, working with banking sectors to block
unlicensed merchant codes and international collaboration between regulators. An in-
dustry poll showed that 73% of regular British gamblers were concerned about privacy
rights and data sharing [79]. Given this, campaigns that highlight how data security risks
are exacerbated within the unlicensed market could deter engagement. Only one article
noted that the Gambling Commission’s resources could be increased to mitigate the “black
market” risk, a notion not without merit. In 2019, the gambling industry praised the actions
of the Gambling Commission:
“The UK has been highly successful in suppressing the development of a black
market for gambling. This is likely to be the result of laws to permit the range
of betting and gaming products that consumers wish to play; the maintenance
of taxes (with some exceptions) at reasonably sensible levels; and by effective
enforcement by the Gambling Commission and other relevant authorities” [97].
A regulator with expanded resource and capabilities could continue to undertake
effective enforcement action. Whilst some articles did contextualise industry statements
on the “black market”, typically by referring to the Gambling Commission’s statement
that the industry may be exaggerating these data, most did not. It was not only industry
press presenting only one viewpoint but also articles published in mainstream and national
media, including The Sun, The Guardian and The Telegraph.
To date, the dominant narrative surrounding the “black market” is framed simply
as one of threat—to consumers, to the economy and to the regulated industry—in what
appears to be a subversion of the precautionary principle, whereby regulatory actions
should be curtailed in order to protect the interests of the existing licensed gambling
industry [98]. This was apparent in 45 of the 55 articles reviewed, with most articles simply
reflecting industry perspectives, with no countervailing viewpoints presented or discussed.
This is, perhaps, to be expected; there was a dominance of industry press within the articles
reviewed and some were opinion pieces written by industry representatives. However,
even within mainstream press, a bias towards simply reflecting industry narratives was
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evident; 9 out of 17 mainstream news articles were pro-industry in tone and reporting.
This highlights concerning and potentially systematic biases in how media are reporting,
co-constructing and legitimising industry narratives through the absence of detailed critic
or analysis of the insight, evidence and arguments put forward.
We systematically extracted and reviewed all articles from two databases in accordance
with a pre-specified review protocol. Whilst every effort was made to include all relevant
media articles that were published between 8 December and 26 May, we did not have
access to articles behind paywalls (usually specialist industry press) and this may have
limited the quantity of the studies included. However, of the studies reviewed, the same
themes were evident across them, particularly as many focused on simply reporting the
details from industry press releases, with the same quotes being cited in many reports.
5. Conclusions
Successful framing is a political act. It determines who sets the agenda for how we
think about gambling and how we deal with it, as well as precludes serious discussion
of alternatives. Industry framing around the potential threat of a “black market” during
the period in which the Gambling Act was under review is a form of regulatory resistance.
It can be seen as part of a wider industry “playbook” designed to undermine public
health initiatives.
The evidence base on which arguments about the “black market” threat is advanced is,
at best, limited and, at worst, unreliable. This creates a space into which industry-funded
narratives can move and fill with their own set of claims and opinions. There is a dearth of
independent, empirical evidence with which to assess the veracity of these claims. This
situation is arguably exacerbated by systematic under-funding of gambling research in
Britain, especially in situations where regulatory changes have been implemented but
not evaluated [11,99]. Despite this, through concerted public relations efforts and with
the (knowing or unknowing) complicitly of some media outlets, a narrative around the
supposed threat of a “black market” has emerged and gained traction. By framing the
debate at an early stage of the Gambling Act review process, this has the potential to
influence both political and public opinion in ways that support the current status quo in
favour of industry-friendly actions to “protect” the “legitimate” market and to “safeguard”
consumers. Such a framing potentially precludes alternative, more far-reaching policy
solutions that are framed in terms of the protection of the population from harms. While
the latter is informed by concerns about the impacts of commercial practices on the health
and wellbeing of the public, policymaking that is framed in terms of concerns about the
“threat” of unlicenced trade is informed by a focus on the financial health of commercial
operators. These different framings both support as well as preclude very different policy
options. Policies in which gambling is framed as a potential source of harm are able
to consider actions such as greater regulation and a restriction of commercial practices
such as advertising and promotion. However, when gambling is framed only in terms
of economic growth, the available options involve actions, such as reduced regulation, to
support commercial practices and to “protect” the industry from the “black market”.
The terms of the debate need to be reframed in a way that allows for consideration of
all of the policy options available, particularly those that are designed to protect the health
and wellbeing of the public from the threat of gambling harms and not merely from the
potential “threat” of a black market. To support these debates, understanding of the “black
market” in Britain needs to be supported by credible evidence based on independent and
rigorous research.
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